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ENCOURAGING DONATION OF ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION BY 
REQUIRING REQUEST 
MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, J.D. 
Abstract Requiring hospitals to request permission from next-
of-kin to harvest organs from a deceased patient is a positive step 
toward reducing the shortage of organs for transplantation. The 
"required request" laws, however, should rely on immunity from 
liability rather than criminal sanctions to encourage compliance. 
The Organ Shortage 
The demand for transplant organs far exceeds the supply. 
In 1982, for example, despite estimates that 7,000 persons 
were awaiting kidney transplants, and that, based on criteria of 
donor suitability, over 40,000 cadaver kidneys should have 
been available, only 3,691 cadaver kidneys were 
lransplanted.1 With the introduction of immunosuppressive 
drugs like cyclosporin that substantially increase the probabil-
ity of a successful transplant outcome, the demand for organs 
has become even greater.2 
Why are donor organs in such short supply? There is no 
serious technological impediment to their availability. Har-
vesting involves a relatively simple surgical procedure.3 Po-
tential donors often can be maintained on artificial systems 
following death long enough to permit transplant organs to be 
removed before they deteriorate. Following removal, organs 
can be preserved extracorporeally (albeit for a limited time) 
until transplantation can take place. 
The organ shortage does not appear to be a product of 
unwillingness to donate. In Colorado 60 percent of those who 
have drivers licenses have indicated, by filling out a form on 
their license, their intent to donate their organs upon death 4 
People are just as willing to agree to have organs removed from 
dead relatives. In France, for example, 90 percent of those who 
were asked gave their consent to the removal of transplant 
organs from next-of-kin.5 
The Consent System 
The problem seems to be that people are not being asked 
to donate, or are not being asked in the right way. There are 
several features of the consent system in the United States that 
might contribute to this. 
First, the presumption is that people do not want to donate 
their organs or those of their next-of-kin. In order to donate, 
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therefore, this presumption must be rebutted by express con-
sent, given either by the potential donor himself or by someone, 
such as a relative, who is authorized to consent in his stead. 
Second, th·ere is no legal requirement that people at some 
point declare their intent either to donate their own organs or 
those of their next-of-kin, or to refuse to donate. 
Finally, little is done to encourage people to donate their 
own organs or those of their relations. Potential donors are 
aided in declaring their intent to donate by the provisions of the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which enables them to fill out 
donor cards or special portions of drivers licenses.6 Private 
organ procurement agencies handle the administrative tasks of 
matching organs to potential recipients and facilitating 
shipment? But there are few incentives to consent to donate or 
to request consent, beyond an individual's own sense of moral 
obligation. 
Until recently, for example, only a few hospitals asked 
relatives of potential donors for permission to harvest. organs, 
and then only infrequently. This reluctance derives at least in 
part from the perceived unpleasantness of forcing the family to 
confront the topic of donation in their time of grief. 
Furthermore, physicians and hospitals are concerned 
about potential legal liability for harvesting organs without 
adequate permission. Lack of consent to harvest might subject 
the health care provider to civil and criminal penalties for theft, 
conversion, and possibly violation of state laws governing 
disposal of the dead. Asking next-of-kin for permission with-
out sufficient sensitivity might give rise to an action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress·8 Obtaining osten-
sible permission from the family might not insulate the har-
vester from suit if there were an interfamily conflict over 
whether or not to consent to donation, or if the family later 
alleged that its consent was invalid due to duress or incapacity 
by virtue of grief. 
Moreover, the structure and functioning of provider insti-
tutions militate against requesting donation. The treating 
physician, who is in the best position to know that a patient is 
dead or dying, and thus to initiate the donation request, typi-
cally is not involved in and derives no specific benefit from 
organ transplantation. Obtaining consent to donation would 
take his time away from his priority activity: the treatment of 
other patients. In addition, if consent is obtained, the donor 
often must be kept on life support systems beyond the point of 
death to maintain the suitability of his organs for transplanta-
tion until they can be harvested by a transplant surgeon. This 
requires equipment and skilled care that might be devoted 
instead to salvageable patients. 
Finally, economic incentives for donation are virtually 
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nonexistent. Under federal law, no person may receive valu-
able consideration for acquiring, receiving, or transferrring an 
organ for transplantation.9 Thus, neither donors nor procurers 
may recover more than reasonable compensation for their 
costs. 
Steps to Increase the Supply of Donor Organs 
Against this background, a number of steps might be taken 
to increase the supply of donor organs. For example, we could 
spend more on education programs to encourage people to 
donate their own organs or those of their next-of-kin. Or we 
could reward willingness to donate with a priority claim on 
future transplant organs for the donor or for a designated 
beneficiary.10 Alternatively, we could relax the prohibition on 
economic incentives for donation-such as by permitting a 
market in organs or by offering tax credits to donors.U All of 
these approaches, however, are disfavored. Educational pro-
grams are expensive, and the marginal cost of stimulating 
additional organs for transplantation may be deemed to be 
excessive. A priority system based on donation would disad-
vantage those who were unable to donate for medical reasons 
and would be difficult to administer. Tax credits would dispro-
portionately benefit persons in higher tax brackets. Finally, a 
market in organs would favor the wealthy, who could outbid 
the poor, and might result in fewer rather than more organs 
available for transplantationP 
Another approach would be to switch frorri the presump-
tion that individuals do not wish to donate unless they ex-
pressly take action to the contrary, to a system in which 
individuals are presumed to consent to donate unless they 
express their unwillingness to do so. This is known as "pre-
sumed consent," and has been adopted in France.13 The ques-
tion that arises is what opportunity must be provided for 
unwillingness to be expressed? Is the burden to come forward 
on the individual-say by executing an instrument that prohib-
its donation? If so, how is the existence of the instrument to be 
made known to organ harvesters? 14 On the other hand, if organs 
cannot be harvested unless the donor or next-of-kin have 
waived their right to object, the presumption has shifted back 
to one of presumed nonconsent-the system currently in 
operation in the United States. 
A more extreme alternative is mandatory harvesting, with 
neither the donor or next-of-kin having the ability to block 
donation. 15 While this can be supported on the basis that any 
property rights that an individual has in his organs should lapse 
upon death, or at least that they are subordinate to the need to 
save other human lives, this approach is unacceptable in view 
of religious objections to cadaver mutilation and the trend in 
favor of patient autonomy. 
Required Request 
A middle ground between the largely voluntary system 
that traditionally has prevailed in this country and more coer-
cive measures, called "required request,"16 has been gaining 
acceptance in the last several years. This alternative focuses on 
the main cause of the shortage of cadaver organs: the failure to 
ask permission for donation. Under required request, the 
hospital (and perhaps other institutions such as hospices) must 
establish a mechanism for insuring that a deceased patient's 
next-of-kin are asked to consent to donationP Required re-
quest laws have now been passed in twenty-four states.18 A bill 
to facilitate state-required request programs has been intro-
duced in Congress.19 
Whilerequiredrequestlaws are probably a step in the right 
direction, they raise several questions. First, it is not clear how 
they are to be enforced. New York reportedly levies a $1000 
fine for each violation;w Kentucky imposes a fine of between 
$100 and $500.21 By and large, however, the required request 
statutes do not create explicit criminal or civil sanctions for 
noncompliance. Enforcement would therefore seem to depend 
on enforcement actions by government officials or private 
parties, which would result in court orders mandating compli-
ance on penalty of contempt, or on the deterrent effect of 
actions for damages that might be brought by potential organ 
recipients claiming to have suffered injury as a result of the 
hospital's failure to request consent. 
In either case, detecting the violation of the required 
request law would be difficult. Some required request laws 
facilitate this by requiring that the making of the request be 
noted on the death certificate.22 Potential plaintiffs-such as 
state health officials, organ procurement agencies, or patient 
groups-could monitor the records to determine if the notation 
is absent, and suit could be brought against a hospital that 
routinely failed to comply. (In the absence of a requirement 
that a public record be made, violations could be detected only 
by more problematic devices such as interviews of next-of-kin 
or disclosures by hospital staff.) But even where the making of 
a request must be noted on the death certificate, the statutes 
contain broad exceptions. No request need be made in New 
York, for example, if there is "actual notice of opposition" by 
the decedent or next-of-kin, or reason to believe that donation 
is contrary to the decedent's religious beliefs.23 A hospital 
could therefore explain the absence of a request notation on a 
death certificate by contending that a member of the family 
objected or that the decedent belonged to a religion that was 
known to oppose organ harvesting, and there would be no 
simply way of determining the validity of the excuse. It is also 
likely that a health professional who simply did not want to 
raise an unpleasant issue with next-of-kin would rely on one of 
these exceptions, with little risk of being penalized. 
Furthermore, most required request statutes do not man-
date that a record be made of a refusal of consent by the 
family, 24 and even fewer provide for recording that a request 
was not made because of known religious or other objection.25 
Hospitals therefore could defend an enforcement action prem-
ised on a small number of recorded consents on the ground that 
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this reflected a large number ofnonrecorded refusals or known 
objections, rather than a routine failure to request consent. 
The lack of effecive enforcement provisions may well be 
deliberate. State legislatures may be reluctant to impose sanc-
tions on providers, or may believe that providers will adhere to 
the legislative command without threats. Indeed, it is arguable 
that providers welcome the laws as an excuse that can be given 
to family members when the issue of donation is raised. 
Moreover, one method of facilitating enforcement-requiring 
a public record of why a request was not made or refused-
might raise the objection that it interfered with the privacy and 
religious rights of patients or their families. 
In the absence of more effective enforcement tools, 
however, the question is whether the required request statutes 
will overcome reluctance to request donation. As noted earlier, 
this reluctance stems from the psychological relationship be-
tween providers and next-of-kin, the structural relationship 
between members of the hospital staff, and concerns about 
liability. A number oflaws provide for special training for the 
hospital personnel who will make the request;26 this might 
alleviate some of their resistance to raising the issue with 
relatives. But the statutes do little to address the other two 
problems, and some actually exacerbate them. 
As noted earlier, the hospital's staff structure frustrates 
organ harvesting by instead emphasizing treatment of salvage-
able patients; the treating personnel are relatively insensitive 
about the patient's status as a potential donor, and therefore 
make little effort to facilitate donation. But this also has an 
important benefit: it reduces the chance that the patient's 
treatment will be compromised or that the patient prematurely 
will be pronounced dead, in order to foster harvesting. The 
possibility of such conflict of interest is reflected, for example, 
in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which stipulates that the 
physician who tends the donor, or who certifies the death, may 
not be part of the transplantation process.27 This safeguard is 
absent from most of the required request statutes, however;28 
by and large, they do not mandate separation of functions 
between treating and harvesting personnel. This oversight 
should be avoided in future required request legislation and 
corrected in existing laws. 
The required request laws also generally do not address 
liability concerns on the part of those involved in obtaining 
consent to donation.29 Unlike the Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act,30 they do not immunize persons acting in good faith to 
obtain consent. They thus omit an important positive incentive 
for providers to responsibly increase the supply of donor 
organs. 
Because the enforcement of required request sanctions is 
ineffective, a carrot rather than a stick approach seems prefer-
able. Immunity from civil and criminal liability would be the 
positive incentive for requesting donation. This would offer 
protection for anyone (hospital, medical staff organization, 
physicians, nurses, social workers, organ procurement agency 
operatives) who acted in good faith in requesting organs for 
donation. They would avoid liability to the family of whom the 
request was made (for example, for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress), and also to potential donees (who other-
wise might complain that inadequate measures were taken to 
obtain transplant organs).31 
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